| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Client-Side Caching (CSC) Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/sysfs: Add CAP_SYS_ADMIN check to __resource_resize_store()
Currently, the __resource_resize_store() allows writing to the
resourceN_resize sysfs attribute to change a BAR's size without checking
for capabilities, currently relying only on the file access check.
Resizing a BAR modifies PCI device configuration and can disrupt active
drivers. After the upcoming conversion to static attributes, it will also
trigger resource file updates via sysfs_update_groups().
Add a CAP_SYS_ADMIN check to prevent unprivileged users from performing BAR
resize operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix buffer overflow during vBIOS update
Clamp the buffer postion to write by setting the bin attribute
to the maximum buffer size so that VFS layer will block the
out-of-bounds accessing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse()
Currently, in ath11k_wmi_tlv_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kcalloc() sizes the
mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to
min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct wmi_mac_phy_capabilities)). The subsequent
memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot via C
pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends short
TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the
allocation.
The reader in ath11k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the
buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match
that stride.
Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the
pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably
consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides.
Compile tested only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: qgroup: fix a wrong length calculation in qgroup_free_reserved_data()
In that function, we round down the start position and round up the
ending position.
But during the calculation of @len, we use "round_up(start + len,
sectorsize)", which is the rounded up end position, not the rounded up
length.
Which results a much larger length, and later we are still using
"start + len", which is completely incorrect.
Fix it by declaring a local @aligned_start and @aligned_len and use them
instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate orphan slot during inode read
Patch series "ocfs2: validate active orphan slots during inode read".
OCFS2 trusts active ordinary and append-DIO orphan slots read from dinodes.
A corrupted slot can therefore index osb_orphan_wipes or the slot-local
system-inode cache outside their allocations before the corruption is
reported.
Patch 1 validates the ordinary orphan slot used by inode wipe processing.
Patch 2 validates the append-DIO orphan slot used by DIO completion and
orphan recovery. Both checks reject corrupt metadata at the existing inode
validation boundary.
This patch (of 2):
[BUG]
A corrupted dinode with OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL can carry an
i_orphaned_slot outside the mounted filesystem slot range.
ocfs2_wipe_inode() uses it to index osb_orphan_wipes before looking
up the orphan directory, causing an out-of-bounds memory access.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840
ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295
evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810
iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline]
iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline]
iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926
ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374
ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() validates i_suballoc_slot but leaves
the active ordinary orphan slot unchecked. Downstream consumers
assume that the value is smaller than osb->max_slots.
[FIX]
Reject an active i_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during
dinode validation, before the inode reaches orphan wipe processing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: bound smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE walks by DACL size
smb_check_perm_dacl() validates that the DACL fits inside the NT
security descriptor, but then bounds its two ACE walks by the
remaining NTSD length (acl_size) rather than the DACL's declared
size (pdacl_size).
When pdacl->size is smaller than the trailing NTSD buffer, bytes
after the declared DACL boundary - still inside the stored security
descriptor - are parsed as ACEs during access checks. A crafted
DACL can place an access-granting ACE beyond pdacl->size, and the
current code accepts it during SMB2_CREATE access validation, while
parse_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl() stop at pdacl_size.
Bound both ACE walks by pdacl_size to match the DACL boundary
semantics used elsewhere in the server.
Validation:
- semantic KUnit harness shows the post-boundary ACE is selected
before the fix and rejected (EACCES) after it
- linux master (7.2-rc6), x86_64 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count
perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the
nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the
policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1]
into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer
permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds
heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the
nested per-class permission table is not.
Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when
perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected.
[PM: tweak comment for line length] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: reject oversized IBs with per-ring packet limits
On GFX rings, amdgpu_cs_p2_ib() passed user-supplied ib_bytes through
to ib->length_dw without a limit, while ring_emit_ib() encodes length
into packet fields. Oversized values can corrupt adjacent control bits
and destabilize command submission.
Add a per-ring IB packet size limit helper and reject command
submissions exceeding the corresponding dword limit before IB
allocation. Use the documented 20-bit limit for GFX/compute/SDMA/VPE,
and apply the MM fallback limit for other ring types.
(cherry picked from commit 7f48fa2cf62e3fa6c9c3870aa74988f773247e52) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: Block VFs from clobbering special CGX PKIND state
PF and VF NIX LFs that share a CGX LMAC reuse the same hardware PKIND
programming. When HiGig2 or EDSA parsing is enabled, a VF NIX LF alloc must
not reset the LMAC RX PKIND or default TX parse config over the PF setup.
Add cgx_get_pkind() and rvu_cgx_is_pkind_config_permitted() so VFs skip
cgx_set_pkind(), rvu_npc_set_pkind(), and NIX_AF_LFX_TX_PARSE_CFG updates
when the LMAC is using NPC_RX_HIGIG_PKIND or NPC_RX_EDSA_PKIND. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: resize log->one_page_buf when adopting on-disk page size
log_replay() allocates log->one_page_buf using the page size that was
chosen from the host PAGE_SIZE:
log->one_page_buf = kmalloc(log->page_size, GFP_NOFS);
Later, when a restart area is found, the log page size recorded on disk
is adopted:
t32 = le32_to_cpu(log->rst_info.r_page->sys_page_size);
if (log->page_size != t32) {
log->l_size = log->orig_file_size;
log->page_size = norm_file_page(t32, &log->l_size,
t32 == DefaultLogPageSize);
}
If the on-disk page size is larger than the size used for the initial
allocation, log->page_size grows but one_page_buf is left at its
original, smaller size. A subsequent unaligned read_log_page() then
reads log->page_size bytes into the undersized scratch buffer:
page_buf = page_off ? log->one_page_buf : *buffer;
err = ntfs_read_run_nb_ra(ni->mi.sbi, &ni->file.run, page_vbo, page_buf,
log->page_size, NULL, &log->read_ahead);
overflowing the allocation. This is reachable when mounting a dirty
NTFS volume whose log was formatted with a page size larger than the
buffer initially allocated on the mounting host (for example a 64K-log
volume mounted on a host that allocated a 4K scratch buffer).
Grow one_page_buf when the adopted on-disk page size exceeds the size
used for the initial allocation. On krealloc() failure the original
buffer is left intact and freed by the existing error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: reject short AUTH_RECEIVE buffers
nvmet_execute_auth_receive() trusts the AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length
after checking only that it is nonzero and matches the transfer length.
In the SUCCESS1 and FAILURE1/default states, that lets a remote NVMe-oF
initiator reach the fixed-size DH-HMAC-CHAP response builders with a
kmalloc() buffer shorter than the response, so nvmet_auth_success1() and
nvmet_auth_failure1() write past the allocation; both only WARN_ON the
short length and then format the message anyway.
Impact: A remote NVMe-oF initiator with access to an auth-enabled target
can trigger a 16-byte heap out-of-bounds write via a one-byte
AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length.
Compute the minimum response length for the current DH-HMAC-CHAP step in
nvmet_auth_receive_data_len() and report a zero data length when the
host-supplied allocation length is shorter, so the existing zero-length
check in nvmet_execute_auth_receive() rejects the command before any
builder runs. The SUCCESS1 minimum is sizeof(struct
nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data) plus the HMAC hash length, because the
response hash is written into the rval[] flexible-array tail, so the
minimum is state dependent rather than a flat sizeof. CHALLENGE keeps its
existing variable-length guard in nvmet_auth_challenge().
This is reachable only when in-band DH-HMAC-CHAP authentication is
configured on the target. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix MCIA register buffer overflow on 32 dword reads
The MCIA register can return up to 32 dwords (128 bytes) when the device
advertises the mcia_32dwords capability, but struct
mlx5_ifc_mcia_reg_bits only defines dword_0..11, leaving room for just
12 dwords (48 bytes) of data.
mlx5_query_mcia() clamps the read size to mlx5_mcia_max_bytes() and then
memcpy()s that many bytes out of the register, potentially reading past
the end of the 'out' buffer. On kernels built with FORTIFY_SOURCE this
is caught as a buffer overflow while reading the module EEPROM via
ethtool:
detected buffer overflow in memcpy
kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1048!
RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x13/0x20
Call Trace:
mlx5_query_mcia.isra.0+0x200/0x210 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_query_module_eeprom_by_page+0x4a/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_get_module_eeprom_by_page+0xbb/0x120 [mlx5_core]
eeprom_prepare_data+0xf3/0x170
ethnl_default_doit+0xf1/0x3b0
Extend the mcia_reg layout to 32 dwords. |
| A flaw was found in xdgmime. A heap-based buffer overflow can be triggered in _xdg_mime_magic_parse_magic_line() in the xdgmimemagic.c file on little-endian systems when an attacker-controlled MIME magic file in a user-writable XDG data location (e.g., in the $XDG_DATA_HOME/mime/magic path) is parsed by an application performing MIME type detection (e.g., via g_content_type_guess()). When performing byte-swap, incorrect pointer arithmetic on the write side causes an out-of-bounds write of 2 bytes, resulting in an application crash or memory corruption. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in GNOME libgsf up to 1.14.60. The impacted element is the function ole_info_read_metabat of the file gsf/gsf-infile-msole.c of the component OLE2 Parser. The manipulation leads to heap-based buffer overflow. The attack can be initiated remotely. The identifier of the patch is a8e25560b74f84c3f86df6ca0ac59195fa5af68a. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in the JJY refclock driver in NTPsec ntpd before 1.2.6 allows an attacker who controls the Telephone JJY time source to corrupt memory or crash ntpd via more than six time replies. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Remote Desktop Client allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Error Reporting allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Windows Search Component allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Use after free in Windows Universal Disk Format File System Driver (UDFS) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
